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Russia is often considered a perfect example of the so-called “resource curse”—the argument that
natural resource wealth tends to undermine democracy. Given high oil prices, some observers see the
country as virtually condemned to authoritarian government for the foreseeable future. Reexamining
various data, I show that such fears are exaggerated. Evidence from around the world suggests that
for countries like Russia with an established oil industry, even large increases in the scale of mineral
incomes have only a minor effect on the political regime. In addition, Russia—a country with an
industrialized economy, a highly educated, urbanized population, and an oil sector that remains majority
private-owned—is unlikely to be susceptible to most of the hypothesized pernicious effects of resource
dependence.
Daniel Treisman
Department of Political Science
UCLA
4289 Bunche Hall





Russia is often thought to be a classic case of the so-called “resource curse”—the idea that 
natural resource wealth tends to impair democracy.
1 Indeed, some see the country as virtually 
doomed to authoritarian politics by its enormous endowments of oil and gas. “Russia’s future 
will be defined as much by the geology of its subsoil as by the ideology of its leaders,” writes 
Moisés Naím, Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Policy magazine, and a former trade and industry 
minister of petroleum-rich Venezuela. “A lot of oil combined with weak public institutions 
produces poverty, inequality, and corruption. It also undermines democracy” (Naím 2004). The 
New York Times columnist Tom Friedman sees a close relationship between world commodity 
prices and the extent of liberty in resource-rich states: a higher oil price means less freedom. 
Russia, from Gorbachev to Putin, seems to him to fit perfectly (Friedman 2006).  
  This view has an immediate plausibility. There is no question that oil and gas have been 
at the core of Russia’s political economy in recent decades. The plunge in petroleum prices in the 
1980s helped create the economic crisis that the last Soviet governments failed to overcome 
(Gaidar 2007). Surging commodity prices after 1998 coincided with the re-centralization of 
power under Putin, the reassertion of Kremlin control over national television, the spread of 
credible reports of electoral fraud, and the harassment of independent social and political 
organizations. The leading state-controlled oil and gas companies even served as the regime’s 
favored tool for chipping away at civic freedoms. It was the Kremlin-led gas monopoly Gazprom 
that, with a mixture of business maneuvers and administrative muscle, took over previously 
                                                            
1 In fact, there are several “resource curse” arguments, asserting respectively that resource wealth: (a) 
slows economic growth, (b) fosters civil wars, and (c) impairs the quality of governance and erodes 
democracy. I focus here exclusively on (c).  
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critical media outlets. And it was the state-owned oil company Rosneft that swallowed assets 
owned by the oligarch Mikhail Khodorokovsky, who had been funding the political opposition 
and civil society groups.  
  Still, arguments that seem to fit so well deserve particular scrutiny. Were oil and gas—
and the fluctuations in their prices—as central to determining the course of political development 
in Russia as advocates of this view suggest? If so, by what pathways did the resource curse 
operate? Is Russia condemned to endure authoritarian government—in the worst case, to 
degenerate into the kind of oil-fueled autocracy characteristic of the Persian Gulf? In this paper, I 
briefly examine the evidence for the resource curse worldwide and use cross-national experience 
to gauge the likely effect of resource wealth on political institutions in Russia.  
The evidence is consistent with the claim that Russia would be somewhat more 
democratic if it had no oil or gas. However, international comparisons also suggest that very 
little of the variation over time in Russia’s political regime since 1985 can be attributed to 
changes in its oil and gas income or reserves. When studied systematically, cross-national data 
imply that for countries like Russia with an established petroleum industry even large gyrations 
in oil revenues have a relatively minor impact. Based on this experience, there is little reason to 
fear that mineral wealth will cause Russia to sink deep into autocracy even if oil prices rise to 
unprecedented heights.  
 
1   What do we know about the “oil curse”? 
In the last decade, scholars have used statistical methods to test the hypothesis that oil and gas 
wealth is inimical to democracy. Most believe there is evidence of a statistically significant 3 
 
relationship, although there are some dissenters.
2 At the same time, recognition has been growing 
that the effects of oil can be quite different in different types of countries and in different periods. 
 Figure 1 plots the political regimes in 2000-05 of the world’s 32 largest oil and gas 
producers. I include all countries that in this period had average annual output of oil and gas 
worth at least $400 per capita at world prices.
3 To classify the countries’ political regimes, I use 
the ratings of the Polity IV dataset (September 2009 revision), compiled by a team under Monty 
Marshall and Keith Jaggers, at George Mason University. The scale runs from -10 to +10. Scores 
of -10 to -6 represent autocracies, and scores of 6 to 10 represent democracies.   
[Figure 1] 
A first point to note is the great variation in types of regime among the major oil 
producers. Their political systems range from consolidated autocracies (like Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar) to consolidated democracies (like Norway and Trinidad and Tobago). Moreover, the 
pattern looks anything but random. With one exception, the countries fall naturally into four 
groups. First, there are the highly industrialized countries of Western  Europe, North America, 
and Oceania. Major oil producers in this category such as Norway, Canada, and Denmark are 
                                                            
2 An excellent review that reaches a positive conclusion is Ross (2009), a revised version of which will 
appear as a chapter in Ross’s forthcoming book, The Curse of Oil Wealth. A skeptical reading of the 
evidence appears in Haber and Menaldo (2009).  
 
3 The data come from Michael Ross, Database on oil and gas income, 2009, UCLA. I am grateful to Ross 
for sharing this. The income data are constructed from the reported physical quantities of oil and gas 
produced, which are then multiplied by the average world price for these commodities. No adjustment is 
made for production costs. Thus, the data represent potential receipts (if all oil and gas were sold at world 
market prices), not profits. So long as the physical quantities are reported accurately, the estimates are not 
vulnerable to distortions generated by transfer pricing, cost inflation, and other deceptive accounting. 
Gaddy and Ickes (2005) argue that such tricks often lead to underestimation of the rents from oil and gas 
in Russia.  
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stable liberal democracies. Research confirms that they are not subject to any resource curse.
4 
Second, there are the oil-rich states of Latin America such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. These are also classified by Polity as democracies, although some are closer to the 
category’s bottom edge. As Dunning has shown, not only is there no evidence of a resource curse 
in Latin America, there appears to be a resource blessing. The oil-rich countries in that region 
have actually been more democratic on average than their peers. Dictatorships in Latin America 
that had oil were more likely to democratize than those that did not.
5   
  The third group consists of oil-producers in Sub-Saharan Africa, which are found 
between -6 and -2 on the 21-point scale, intermediate regimes just above the range of 
“autocracy.” In this region, scholars have found evidence that greater resource dependence 
renders democracies more vulnerable (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). Fourth, there are the 
countries of the Muslim world. It is striking that all the countries at the bottom of Figure 1 have 
large Muslim communities. (The converse is not true: some Muslim oil producers like Malaysia 
are closer to democracy than dictatorship.) Indeed, among the major oil producers, the only ones 
that Polity classified as autocracies, with scores of -6 or lower, were countries in which Muslim 
adherents made up more than three quarters of the population. Of course, this is merely an 
observation about the pattern rather than a claim about what causes what. Some evidence 
presented below suggests that, once all the differences among countries are taken into account, 
the effects of oil and gas are just as strong in non-Muslim as in Muslim countries.  
                                                            
4 Ross (2009) finds, for instance, that greater oil and gas income is not associated with a greater chance of 
democratic failure in countries with income per capita above $5,000.   
 
5 Dunning (2008). See also Ross (2009, 8-9). 5 
 
  Finally, there is the one country that does not belong in any of these groups—Russia—
which, in Figure 1, appears to blend in with Latin America.  
  Some simple statistics help to elucidate the patterns in the data. In Table 1, I show a 
series of regressions of countries’ Polity scores on the natural log of their per capita income from 
oil and gas. In all regressions, I control for the natural log of countries’ gross domestic product 
per capita (at purchasing power parity, from the Penn World Tables), since a great deal of work 
suggests that more developed countries tend to be more democratic. All regressions are run on 
panels that include all countries for which data were available in the period from 1960 to 2005. 
To reduce autocorrelation, I follow established practice and use only observations from every 
fifth year, starting in 1960.
6 In all regressions, I include a full set of year dummies. In models 1 
to 9, I also include country fixed effects, which control for any unchanging characteristics of the 
country. Thus, these regressions pick up the way in which, within given countries, changing 
levels of oil and gas income correlate over time with the nature of those countries’ political 
regimes. In models 10-18, I do not include country fixed effects, but include a one-period 
autoregressive process to correct for autocorrelation. Thus, these models capture both 
correlations between petroleum income and regimes over time and correlations between these 
variables across countries. Since the correlations across countries may be caused by other factors 
left out of the regressions, these models may overestimate the true effects of oil.   
[Table 1] 
Columns 1 and 10 show that, looking at all countries for the full period from 1960 to 
2005, there is a statistically significant relationship between higher oil and gas income and less 
                                                            
6 See Ross (2009), Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008). 6 
 
democratic government. This is so whether one looks just at change over time (model 1) or both 
variation over time and across countries (model 10). If one controls for the nature of the regime 
five years earlier, the effect of oil and gas income is still significant, but only a little more than 
half as large (models 2 and 11). Thus, the short run effect of an increase in resource income may 
be smaller than the total effect. Although the effect of oil and gas appears weaker in 
predominantly Muslim countries if we look at the random effects models (compare the 
coefficients of -.23 in column 12 and -.52 in column 10), controlling for all countries’ fixed 
characteristics, more oil and gas income is associated with just as large a decrease in democracy 
in non-Muslim countries (columns 3 and 1).
7  
  Controlling for country characteristics, and looking at the full period, it is only among 
very poor countries that oil and gas income correlates over time with less democracy. If one 
looks also at the cross-country variation, however, the strongest correlation is among countries at 
intermediate levels of development (GDP per capita at PPP between $5,000 and $15,000). Ross 
has noted that the relationship between resource wealth and less democracy does not appear in 
data from before the early 1980s. Up to that point, oil and gas did not appear to have any 
negative effect. It was in the “Third Wave” of democracy, which culminated in the East 
European transition from communism, that major oil producers started to stand out, 
democratizing less than their oil-poor neighbors. The regressions in Table 1 confirm this. In the 
fixed effects regressions, there is no effect of oil in the period before 1985, and in the random 
effects models the earlier effect is weaker (columns 7, 8, 16, and 17).  
                                                            
7 It could be, however, that the fixed effect regressions underestimate the impact of changes in oil and gas 
income on democracy in Muslim countries because a good number of the major Muslim oil producers 
were from early on at the bottom of Polity’s scale, with nowhere further to drop.  7 
 
The impact of oil at different income levels also appears to change after 1985. In the later 
period, it was actually the countries at intermediate income levels that showed the strongest 
effect of mineral wealth. I therefore present one final pair of models (colums 9 and 18) that 
include only countries with intermediate income levels in the post-1985 period. These models 
show the largest estimated effects of oil and gas income on democracy that I have been able to 
find by experimenting with different specifications.   
  In short, the regressions illustrate and confirm the results of earlier work on the 
relationship between mineral wealth and democracy. Since the early 1980s—but not before 
that—poor and middle income countries outside Latin America that earned large amounts of 
income from oil and gas have tended to become less democratic. 
 
2   What does this imply about Russia? 
Most of the models in Table 1 suggest a statistically significant negative relationship between 
petroleum income and democracy. It is difficult to be sure how large the effect is given the wide 
range of estimates across different specifications. But the pattern of evidence worldwide is 
generally consistent with the claim that Russia would be more democratic today if it had no oil 
or gas at all.  
  What about the effect of changes in Russia’s oil and gas income since the late Soviet 
period? Between 1985 and 1998, the value of Russia’s oil and gas output fell from $2,207 per 
capita to $476 per capita, by Ross’s estimates. By 2006, the value had risen again to $2,765. As 
many observers have pointed out, the fall and rise in Russia’s oil receipts mirror the rise and fall 8 
 
in political freedom in the country under the consecutive leadership of Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and 
Putin. Can oil explain Russia’s political trajectory?  
  The answer appears to be: only a small part of it. The true effect of petroleum income 
probably lies somewhere within the range defined by the coefficients in the various models of 
Table 1. It turns out that whichever of these one uses, the implied effect of Russia’s changing oil 
and gas income is surprisingly small. A low estimate is the coefficient of -.32 in model 1. The 
highest estimate is the coefficient of -1.58 in model 9. Applying these to the Russian data, the 
drop in oil and gas earnings after 1985 predicts an increase in Russia’s Polity score of between 
0.5 and 2.4 points on the 21-point Polity scale. The increase in oil and gas income after 1998 
implies a fall in the country’s Polity score of 0.6 to 2.8 points. Figure 2 shows the predicted path 
of Russia’s score based on just the variation over time in its oil and gas income.  
[Figure 2] 
  Clearly, if the experience of other countries is a guide, the ups and downs of Russia’s 
petroleum income can explain at most a small fraction of the changes in its political regime over 
the last 25 years. This, too, is consistent with what previous research has shown about the 
“resource curse”. As Ross pointed out in a seminal article in 2001, the marginal effect of oil on 
the political regime falls sharply as the amount of oil produced increases (Ross 2001). This is 
captured here by the modeling of the oil effect in logs. In models with the oil and gas income 
variable not logged (not shown here), this variable has a perversely positive coefficient in the 
fixed effects basic model, marginally significant. It is significantly negative in the random effects 
models. But here too, the implied effect is small. In a version of model 10 with oil and gas 
income not logged, the estimated coefficient implies that the increase in oil and gas income 
between 1998 and 2006 should have reduced Russia’s Polity score by just 0.2 points.  9 
 
  The effects of oil are not always tiny. For a country that starts producing a large amount 
of oil from scratch, the implied effect on the regime can be sizeable. In Equatorial Guinea, 
between 1990 and 2005, oil and gas income increased from nothing to $13,674 per capita. Since 
the country’s GDP per capita started out well below $5,000, I use the estimated coefficient of -
.60 from model 4 in Table 1. The model predicts a fall in Equatorial Guinea’s Polity score of 
almost six points. The diminishing marginal effect of oil also implies an asymmetry worth 
keeping in mind. Were Russia’s oil and gas income to increase from its present level, the models 
suggest this would lead to only a very small further deterioration in its politics. By contrast, were 
Russia’s oil and gas income to dry up completely, the implied increase in democracy would be 
much larger.  
  The small size of the estimated effect in Russia is not just an idiosyncracy of my analysis.  
Applying the estimates of other scholars yields similar results. For instance, Silje Aslaksen 
(2010) estimates the relationship between the value of countries’ oil production (as a share of 
GDP) and democracy, as measured by both Polity and Freedom House. Using either democracy 
measure, she finds coefficients of -.002 to -.004, depending on the specification, where the 
dependent variable, democracy, is normalized to range between 0 and 1. Using the same data 
(from the World Bank’s Adjusted Saving Database), I find that Russia’s oil production as a share 
of GDP rose from about 11 percent in 1998 to about 23 percent in 2006, an increase of 12 
percentage points. Applying Aslaksen’s estimated coefficients, this increase would result in a 
decrease in democracy of between 2.4 and 4.8 points on a 100-point scale. On the Polity scale, 
running from -10 to +10, that corresponds to a change of just 0.5 to 1 point.  
  In another paper, Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2009) demonstrate that among autocracies 
and imperfect democracies, greater proven oil reserves correlate with lower media freedom, as 10 
 
judged by the organization Freedom House. This relationship holds both cross-nationally and 
over time. However, again the oil variable enters logarithmically, which implies that for 
countries like Russia the effect of recent changes is very small. Using the largest negative 
coefficient the authors obtained (-2.87, from their Model 5, Table 1), I calculate that the massive 
increase in the value of Russia’s proven oil reserves from $710 billion in 1998 to $7.68 trillion in 
2008 should have reduced press freedom by seven points on a 100-point scale—roughly 
equivalent to the gap in press freedom between the US and Norway.
8  
  In short, the pattern of evidence from around the world suggests that the ups and downs 
in Russia’s oil and gas income in recent decades have had only a minor influence on its regime. 
Given that, by almost any measure, very large changes occurred in Russia’s political system 
during the last 25 years, one must look to other factors to explain these changes. Of course, oil 
and gas revenues may have been more important in certain years, but on average they apear to 
have played a secondary role.   
 
3   Specific pathways 
The apparently limited impact of oil on politics in Russia makes sense when one considers the 
various mechanisms by which scholars have argued that natural resource wealth blocks or erodes 
                                                            
 
8 The coefficient, -2.87, is from a model in which media freedom is regressed on the log of oil reserves 
multiplied by the world oil price, controlling for log GDP per capita, log population and log government 
expenditure as a share of GDP. The regression is run on just “non-democracies”—i.e. countries with 
Polity scores below six. Of course, press freedom is just one element or concomitant of democracy; if oil 
affects other aspects of democracy as well, the total effect would be greater. Unlike Polity, which did not 
record a deterioration in Russia’s democracy until 2007, the Freedom House media index recorded a 
sharp drop in freedom starting from 1999. For a skeptical view of Freedom House’s ratings—for instance 
its equation of press freedom in Russia to that in Yemen—see Treisman (2010).  11 
 
democracy. It is hard to find much evidence of these mechanisms at work in Russia. There are 
five main arguments.  
 
3.1   Fiscal bargains 
The argument that has found the most support is that large mineral endowments obviate the need 
for rulers to come to agreement with their subjects over fiscal issues.  Democracy developed in 
Europe, according to one popular view, because rulers were forced to grant representation to at 
least some classes of the population in return for taxation. By contrast, in resource-rich states, 
rulers can live as “rentiers,” spending their revenues from the sale of minerals rather than relying 
on taxes.    
This fits the situation in the Persian Gulf, where the burden of taxation is, indeed, 
unusually low. In Bahrain, tax revenues make up just four or five percent of GDP; in Kuwait, 
they come to about one percent (World Bank 2009). Qatar has no personal income tax, no tax on 
personal property, and no value added or sales tax. Despite not paying much tax at all, the 
country’s population receives a remarkable set of benefits from the state—from free education, 
healthcare, and telephone service to guaranteed jobs in the civil service upon graduation from 
high school, housing allowances, and free plots of land (Kamrava 2009). Overwhelmed with 
royal largesse, most Qataris have been reluctant to campaign for political rights.  
Of course, the “rentier” argument assumes that there are sufficient rents to keep the 
public at bay. Yet oil states differ greatly in how large their oil revenues are in per capita terms.  
In Qatar and its Persian Gulf neighbors, the amounts are truly astounding. If the value of oil and 
gas produced in 2006 had been shared among all Qataris, each would have received $45,000.
9 
                                                            
9 Calculated from Michael Ross, Database on oil and gas income, 2009, UCLA.  12 
 
The government could have financed all its expenditures for two years with its annual revenues 
from exports of oil and gas.
10 In many other oil states, however, the take is far more modest. In 
Malaysia, for instance, the country’s total income from oil and gas in 2006, valued at world 
prices, came to only $1,300 per capita (see Figure 1). In the oil-rich sultanate of Brunei, fuel 
exports in 2006 came to 64 percent of GDP. In Malaysia, they were 14 percent (Table 2). The 
political consequences of $45,000 a year per capita in oil income are bound to be different from 
those of $1,000 a year. 
[Table 2] 
Another key distinction is whether oil and gas are exploited by the state itself or by 
private companies, which the state must then tax. In recent years, about three quarters of all oil 
was produced worldwide by state-owned national oil companies (McPherson 2003, p.3). But 
there are some exceptions. The logic of the “rentier” argument suggests that if governments must 
bargain with the private sector owners of oil companies over taxation, this could lead to a more 
open and competitive type of politics.
11  
How do these considerations apply to Russia? Although its oil and gas reserves are vast, 
so is its population. As a result, its annual income from oil and gas per capita—about $2,800 in 
2006, if all sold at world market prices, which it was not—is nowhere near that of a Persian Gulf 
emirate.
12 Revenues from oil and gas exports in 2006 came to about $1,340 per person, a bit 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 Revenues from fuel exports in 2006 came to about $31 billion; government expenditures, to about $14 
billion (calculated from World Bank (2009)).  
11 Jones Luong and Weinthal (2006) argue that the weak institutions associated with resource wealth 
should “instead be attributed to the pathologies associated with state ownership.” When resource sectors 
are predominantly privately owned, there are incentives for the creation of strong institutions.  
 
12 Much of Russia’s oil and gas is sold domestically, at prices that have in the past been far below world 
prices.  13 
 
below the level for Australia.
13 The budget derived only about one third of its revenues in 2007 
from oil and gas.
14 As for ownership of the oil sector, Russia since the mid-1990s has been one 
of a handful of countries that includes the USA and Canada where most oil is produced by 
independent, private companies, rather than in projects dominated by the state (with or without 
foreign partners). It is easy to forget this amid the outcry over Putin’s measures to expand the 
state’s presence. But even after the re-nationalizations of Yukos and Sibneft and the revision of 
terms on the Sakhalin II project, estimates of the share of oil produced in majority state-owned 
companies ranged from 37 to 42 percent.
15 In the gas sector, the state’s stake in Gazprom was 
increased to just over 50 percent through the repurchase of shares. But at the same time it 
became legal for foreigners to own shares directly.
16  
As a result, although the oil and gas sectors contribute a great deal to the budget, most 
revenues come from other sectors. And much of the oil and gas revenues have to be extracted in 
the form of taxes from privately owned companies. The government cannot live off its rents. Nor 
does it have remotely enough oil wealth to keep the population cocooned in a Persian-Gulf-style 
system of cradle-to-grave benefits. As a result, the government must enter into negotiations with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
13 Fuel export revenues calculated from World Bank (2009). 
14 Calculated from OECD (2009, p.55). 
15 Hanson (2009, p.15), OECD (2006, p.38), Rutland (2008). Rutland points out that not only does Russia 
have a sizeable private oil sector, it also has competition among its domestic oil producers.  
16 Of course, private ownership means a great deal more when property rights are secure. In Russia, the 
owners of private oil companies rely on connections to those in high office to prevent predatory 
interventions. Minority shareholders in Gazprom understand very well that decisions on corporate 
strategy are made by the government. Still, a game with two sides in which one side is weak is different 
from a game with just one side. Were the incumbent political team to weaken, magnates controlling large 
concentrations of private wealth could reconsider their allegiances. Another point to note is that 
ownership of the oil industry is endogenous. As Guriev, Kolotilin, and Sonin (2008) show, state 
expropriations of oil companies tend to increase when the oil price is high.  
 14 
 
the private sector—in the 1990s, the level of ad hoc bargaining was considered a scandal—and it 
has worked to create a modern tax system, with personal income taxes, VAT, and payroll taxes. 
Tax revenues of the consolidated budget came to about 30 percent of GDP in 2007.
17 
 
3.2   Repression 
A second argument is that revenues from oil and gas enable governments to repress their 
populations. Mineral rents provide the cash to hire more policemen, train security services, and 
monitor citizens with high technology equipment. The huge stakes involved might also make 
incumbents more determined to use violence to crush political opposition.  
  Ross examined this, using as a measure of repression the annual frequencies of torture, 
extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and disappearances attributable to the government, 
as collected from US State Department human rights reports by Cingranelli and Richards (2008). 
He found that, in fact, controlling for regime type, oil producers were no more repressive than 
non-oil producers (Ross 2009).  
 
3.3   Oil and modernization 
An influential tradition of thought argues that democratization tends to occur only after societies 
are transformed by modernization. The spread of education, industrialization, urbanization, 
occupational specialization, and modern mass media prompt new popular demands for 
government accountability. However, if countries grow rich by extracting oil or other minerals, 
the social changes associated with modernization in Western Europe and North America may not 
                                                            
17 Calculated from Goskomstat RF (2008). See also Tompson (2005).  15 
 
take place. Minerals can be extracted in enclaves, often staffed by foreigners, while the 
surrounding society remains predominantly traditional.   
  Whether such social transformations are necessary or sufficient conditions for 
democratization is debated. The Soviet Union was able to industrialize without prompting any 
mass demands for democracy before the Gorbachev years.
18 But, regardless, the argument that 
resource wealth prevents industrialization does not apply well to countries that were already 
industrialized when they discovered oil or when the oil boom of the 1970s occurred, creating 
massive rents for petroleum producers. Oil rich states began from very different starting points. 
In the Persian Gulf and North Africa, many were tribal communities of farmers, nomads, traders, 
or pearl divers when the oil industry first developed. By contrast, others were highly 
industrialized and urbanized, with educated populations and extensive mass media. Norway and 
Denmark, for instance, were already stable, industrialized democracies by the 1970s when North 
Sea oil came on line. As noted, such countries have shown no signs of sliding into autocracy as 
oil revenues grew. Similarly, the prior industrialization of many Latin American countries may 
help explain why mineral wealth there did not impede democratization.  
In this regard, Russia looks like one of the oil producers least likely to fall victim to the 
curse. Although just a middle-income country, Russia was even more industrialized than many 
of the Latin American mineral-rich states when oil prices first spiked. Developed in the 
distinctive Soviet manner, it has rates of educational and scientific achievement more 
comparable to those of developed countries (see Table 3). Along with the other former Soviet oil 
producers, it has an unusually high rate of female labor participation. Maintaining political 
control over a literate, highly educated population, rich in scientists, where women are integrated 
                                                            
18 One can define modernization to include not just industrialization but also the development of high 
quality institutions, but then it becomes almost tautological to say that modernization leads to democracy. 
I defer discussion of the quality of institutions to Section 3.5.  16 
 
into the workforce, is bound to be more challenging than imposing an authoritarian regime on 
traditional communities of farmers and local traders. 
[Table 3] 
 
3.4   Media Freedom 
As already  mentioned, Egorov et al. find a relationship between oil reserves and lower media 
freedom. However, as also noted, the effects of new reserves or increases in the oil price turn out 
to be small for countries that already had significant proven reserves. The implied effect for 
Russia was tiny.  
 
3.5  Corruption 
Finally, resource wealth is often thought to  foster corruption, which might in turn erode 
democracy or perpetuate dictatorship. Widespread graft is likely to discredit democratic officials 
and may make them eager to reduce the transparency of government. Steven Fish argues that this 
was a main reason for Russia’s stalled democratization (Fish 2005, p.134). 
  Is there a relationship between oil income and corruption? Where oil and gas are 
abundant, corruption is perceived to be higher. Various scholars, using indexes of perceived 
corruption compiled by polling international businessmen and experts, have found a relationship 
between perceived corruption as captured by such indexes and natural resource wealth.
19 Oil rich 
states such as Qatar and Equatorial Guinea are perceived to be considerably more corrupt than 
most others at their income level. Russia is perceived to be somewhat more corrupt than one 
would expect given its gdp per capita.  
                                                            
19 The first study to find this was Ades and Di Tella (1999). 17 
 
  However, perceptions are sensitive to how countries are portrayed in the world media. 
Experts may reason backwards; if they have come to associate oil rents with corruption, they 
may assume oil-rich states are corrupt. If belief in such an association becomes widespread, it 
may influence how journalists pick and frame the stories they report in oil-rich countries. In a 
previous paper, I showed that measures of perceived corruption did not always coincide with 
measures of corruption based on surveys in which individuals or businesses were asked concrete 
questions about whether members of their family or “firms like theirs” had been expected to 
make unofficial payments during the previous year (Treisman 2007). In the data from such 
experience-based surveys, evidence of a link between oil and higher corruption is far weaker, 
and often non-existent. For instance, using reports on the frequency of bribery from the World 
Bank’s World Business Environment Survey (which surveyed firm managers) and the 
organization Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer Survey (which 
interviewed individuals), I found little or no relationship, even controlling for income. In Russia, 
reports of bribery were not more frequent on average than in other countries around its income 
level.
20   
  These surveys inevitably focus more on low level corruption than on kleptocracy at the 
top. Low level officials do not appear to be more corrupt in countries with mineral wealth. But 
the story might be different for government ministers. In Russia, as the oil price rose after 1999, 
stories circulated of brazen venality at the highest levels involving mind-boggling sums. Such 
                                                            
 
20 It is possible that there is underreporting of corruption in surveys that ask about respondents’ direct 
experience. Many surveys seek to avoid alarming respondents by asking about bribery in “firms like 
yours” rather than in the respondent’s own enterprise. Such underreporting would only bias estimates if 
underreporting were greater in countries with natural resources than in those without. It is not obvious 
why that should be the case.   
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stories may very well be true.
21 Unfortunately, there is little way to know—and to compare the 
scope of such corruption in Russia to that in other countries that lack oil. Nor is it clear whether 
or not corruption itself undermines democracy. There are some suggestive arguments to this 
effect, but as yet little empirical evidence to back them up.  
 
4   Conclusion 
Russia’s oil and gas income—even at the height of the recent price surge—was nowhere near 
enough to fund the kind of politically enervating welfare state found in the Persian Gulf. 
Moreover, much of the government’s share of oil revenues still has to be extracted in the form of 
taxes from the private magnates who control most of the country’s oil production. Unlike in 
Qatar or Kuwait, the Russian state will have to continue taxing the population, and dealing with 
the discontent that engenders. Nor can Russia’s oil preclude modernization since the country is 
in most ways already modernized. Rising oil prices since 1999 may have prompted a reduction in 
press freedom, but, judging from experience elsewhere, only by a very small amount. Oil-rich 
states like Russia are perceived to be more corrupt. But, although it is certainly possible that they 
are, there is little reliable evidence to this effect.  
  If Russia’s oil and gas do not doom the country to autocracy, they do nevertheless play a 
part in a more complicated process. Surging oil prices have in certain periods stimulated 
economic growth. As in many other countries, improving economic conditions buy the president 
                                                            
21 One possible indirect indicator reported in the Russian press is the frequency with which top officials 
are observed wearing watches that cost tens of thousands of dollars. Prime Minister Putin has been 
photographed wearing a Patek Philippe watch that retails for about $60,000 (Russky Newsweek, 
“Starinnye chasy yeshche idut,” February 14, 2005). Unfortunately, there are no time series datasets on 
this variable.   19 
 
greater popular support (Treisman 2009, 2010). At moments of overwhelming popularity, a 
president has the opportunity to make significant changes to the system, pushing it towards either 
more or less democracy. President Putin, with an approval rating close to 80 percent, chose the 
latter. This was not inevitable; had the Kremlin candidate in 2000 been a more committed 
democrat, one can imagine that the subsequent boom might have helped sustain support for 
further democratic reforms. At the same time, the price of oil, although important, was not the 
only determinant of Russia’s growth rate. Studies suggest that higher oil prices explain between 
one third and one half of the total growth since 1999.
22 The impact of oil prices was apparently 
stronger in 2005-9 than in 1999-2001, when growth was fueled by the effects of devaluation, and 
2001-4, when higher output of oil and minerals—mostly achieved by private companies—was at 
least as important as higher prices. Thus, the path from oil prices to weaker democracy in Russia 
since 1999 has been somewhat indirect and contingent.   
  More generally, resource endowments have two effects. First, they may provide rents 
that, if controlled by the government, can be used for political purposes. Second, dependence on 
commodity exports subjects countries to sometimes extreme economic gyrations as the prices of 
commodities are more volatile than those of manufactured products and services (Jacks, 
O’Rourke, and Williamson 2009). In countries for which the rents are large relative to the 
volatility, natural resources may enable incumbent rulers to entrench themselves and avoid 
sharing power. In those for which the volatility is large relative to the rents, the main political 
consequence of resource dependence is likely to be not so much authoritarianism as instability.  
                                                            
22 Suni (2007) estimates that higher oil prices explain about 2.5 points (38 percent) of the 6.5 percent 
average growth rate in 2001-06. Beck, Kamps and Mileva (2007),  reviewing previous studies, note 
estimated long-run elasticities of GDP to permanent increases in the oil price of .15 to .20. Using the 
monthly prices of European Brent oil, these elasticities imply that the change in oil prices in 1999-2007 
can explain 25 to 33 points of the 72 percent increase in GDP (measured in constant rubles) between 
those years—or, in other words, 35 to 46 percent of the total growth.  20 
 
Such instability may not always be bad for democracy. If the instability is moderate, it 
may help facilitate turnover at the top of the state.
23 Turnover does not by itself create 
democracy, but from alternation of elites democracy can emerge. On the other hand, extreme 
instability may discredit and incapacitate the state, leading to civil conflict rather than peaceful 
alternation. From this perspective, the second rank oil producers of Latin America and Asia 
(Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia) may have a combination of rents and 
volatility that is consistent with—or even conducive to—democratization, while the major oil 
producers like Qatar and Brunei have such high rents that the volatility is hardly felt. To the 
extent this is correct, Russia fits best into the first category, along with Latin American peers like 
Mexico and Venezuela. Its mineral wealth adds an element of periodic turbulence to its political 




23 If dependence is only moderate, however, the incumbents may be able to shield themselves from 
political instability by saving significant oil revenues in reserve funds—as Russia has done—and using 
these funds to cushion price shocks. The effectiveness of such a strategy obviously depends on how great 
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N  1,232  1,066  970  655  350  227  532  700  200  1,232  1,066  970  655  350  227  532  700  200 
Countries  157  157  122  103  86  43  131  157  66  157  157  122  103  86  43  131  157  66 
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   % GDP $ per capita % GDP  $ per capita
Brunei Darussalam  64  19,258 Iran, Islamic Rep. 29  915
Bahrain  62  13,306 Singapore 26  8,101
Qatar  59  30,918 Norway 25  17,779
Trinidad and Tobago  57  8,144 Belarus 20  777
United Arab Emirates  56  21,333 Russian Federation  19  1,340
Oman  55  7,388 Ecuador 18  571
Saudi Arabia  54  8,101 Cote d'Ivoire 18  159
Azerbaijan  52  1,298 Bolivia 17  202
Gabon  49  3,343 Vietnam 16  115
Algeria  46  1,606 Malaysia 14  845
Nigeria  39  399 Sudan 14  128
Yemen, Rep.  36  319 Syria 13  223
Venezuela, RB  33  2,233 Cameroon 12  121























Russia  18.2  Denmark  72.5  Norway  75.5  Denmark  918  Denmark  4721  Kazakhstan  49.4 
Venezuela  18.0  Canada  66.0  Denmark  70.5  Canada  743  Norway  4571  Russia  49.2 
Canada  17.5  Russia  57.9  Russia  70.4  Norway  717  Canada  3723  Norway  47.1 
Turkmen.  16.2  Norway  57.3  Canada  60.6  Russia  107  Russia  3340  Turkmen.  46.8 
Denmark  15.3  Kazakhstan  52.7  Libya  51.4  Kuwait  100  Kazakhstan  663  Denmark  46.7 
Kazakhstan  14.5  Iran    46.9  Kazakhstan  43.9  UAE  49  Libya  361  Canada  46.3 
Brunei   13.6  Kuwait  46.2  Venezuela   39.7  Oman  41  Brunei   279  Gabon  44.4 
UAE  13.2  Trinidad   45.2  Bahrain  32.8  S. Arabia  26  Algeria  170  Trinidad   42.1 
Iran    11.5  Venezuela   44.0  S. Arabia  25.7  Iran    24  Venezuela   150  Brunei   40.6 
Norway  10.3  Oman  43.5  Iran    23.0  Venezuela   21  Kuwait  73  Venezuela   37.3 
S. Arabia  9.7  UAE  42.9  UAE  21.9  Algeria  9  Qatar  n.a.  Eq. Guinea  33.6 
Oman  7.6  S. Arabia  41.1  Algeria  20.0  Kazakhstan  7  Eq. Guinea  n.a.  Algeria  30.1 
Eq. Guinea  7.1  Gabon  36.4  Kuwait  19.9  Qatar  n.a.  UAE  n.a.  Iran    28.3 
Trinidad   6.9  Turkmen.  35.4  Oman  18.9  Brunei   n.a.  Trinidad   n.a.  Kuwait  23.1 
Algeria  6.3  Brunei   32.5  Qatar  18.0  Eq. Guinea  n.a.  S. Arabia  n.a.  Libya  22.3 
Gabon  4.3  Algeria  31.9  Brunei   14.4  Trinidad   n.a.  Oman  n.a.  Bahrain  21.0 
Kuwait  2.6  Eq. Guinea  3.7  Trinidad   8.5  Libya  n.a.  Turkmen.  n.a.  Oman  17.3 
Qatar  n.a.  Qatar  n.a.  Eq. Guinea  2.7  Turkmen.  n.a.  Bahrain  n.a.  S. Arabia  13.9 
Libya  n.a.  Libya  n.a.  Gabon  n.a.  Bahrain  n.a.  Gabon  n.a.  UAE  13.5 
Bahrain  n.a.  Bahrain  n.a.  Turkmen.  n.a.  Gabon  n.a.  Iran    n.a.  Qatar  12.7 
Source: Adapted from Treisman (2010) data from World Bank (2009). 
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Figure 2.   Oil and gas income and Russia's political regime, 1985 
to 2008
Actual Polity 
score
Polity score 
predicted from 
change in oil and 
gas income, high 
estimate
Polity score 
predicted from 
change in oil and 
gas income, low 
estimate
Sources: Author's calcualtions, using Polity IV (September 2009 update). Polity scores are  for USSR 
in 1985‐91, Russia in 1992‐08. Predictions made starting from initial Polity score of ‐7 and adding 
changes implied by the coefficients on Ln oil and gas income in Table 1, models 1 and 9.